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Despite the popularity that the embodied cognition thesis has gained in recent years,
memories of events personally experienced are still conceived as disembodied mental
representations. It seems that we can consciously remember our personal past through sensory
imagery, through concepts, propositions and language, but not through the body. In this
article, I defend the idea that the body constitutes a genuine means of representing past
personal experiences. For this purpose, I focus on the analysis of bodily movements
associated with the retrieval of a personal memory, which have certain features that make
them different from procedural memories, pragmatic actions and common gestures, as well as
other forms of embodied memories found in recent literature. I refer to these as “kinetic
memories” and analyse their representative nature as well as their adaptive functions. Kinetic
memories are bodily movements in which some event or action that took place in the past can
be seen, because they are an externalisation of the subject’s inner intention of representing a
past personal experience. Kinetic memories represent a past experience sometimes by
imitation of a past movement, and other times through embodied symbols and metaphors.
Furthermore, although sometimes they present direct pragmatic benefits, such as
communicative benefits, they seem to enhance the whole reexperience of the past event and
memory recall, which I argue is one important adaptive value.
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“The body knows things about which the mind is ignorant”
Jacques Lecoq (1997/2002)
We are used to expressing past experiences and fictitious stories through narratives.
Because everyday narratives are generally linguistic and visual, we attribute only to words
and images the capacity of referring to particulars, often forgetting the potentiality of bodily
movements to carry specific meanings and to tell stories. But theatre practitioners, and more
especially mime artists, do not forget this. An outstandingly rich analysis of the potential
expressiveness of the body is found in the writings of Jacques Lecoq, a French actor, mime,
and acting instructor, who spent his life studying and exploring the movements of the human
body. He considered bodily movements to be a form of knowledge for both actors and
spectators. Reality could be better grasped through movement, allowing actors and spectators
to discover new meanings that other forms of expression, such as words, could not convey.
The discovery and rediscovery of the possibilities of the body was supposed to allow actors to
learn how to “write” a play with their own bodies, how to “speak” on stage with full physical
awareness. For this purpose, actors needed not only to observe and imitate or “mimic” the
richness of human bodily movements, but also to learn to recognize the hidden dynamics of
unmoving elements (such as colors or buildings) and “mime” them, that is, express them
through gestures and bodily movements (Lecoq, 1987/2006). Lecoq’s method aimed to help
his students to rid themselves of the conventional forms of behavior imposed by society, in
order for them to consciously recover the freedom of movement characteristic of childhood
(Lecoq, 1997/2002).
For Lecoq, bodily movements were essential not only to theatre, but also to human life
itself. He was probably right: although as we grow up our bodily movements become more
rigid and impersonal and in western culture at least, we narrow down (and sometimes we
intentionally hide) our bodily expressions, we all carry a potential actor inside that
occasionally awakens. As Lecoq himself mentions, it is not uncommon that during a family
reunion, the “comedian” of the family stands up and imitates each person present (1987/2006,
p. 68). During a conversation between friends, the extrovert member of the group might use
her whole body to recount a past personal experience. These sorts of real life “theatrical
performances” done offstage to tell a past personal experience have nonetheless received little
attention as objects of study.
In philosophy as well as in psychology, memories of past events which were
personally experienced by the rememberer are commonly associated with two capacities: the
capacity of remembering or recollecting events, which in the literature is known as episodic
memory (Tulving, 1972), and the capacity of knowing what was previously experienced,
called personal semantic memory or semantic autobiographical memory (Levine, Turner,
Tisserand, Hevenor, Graham, and McIntosh, 2004; Tulving, 1985). Episodic memory is
associated with the ability of mental time travel through subjective time, and is generally
characterized as a mental representation with rich phenomenological details (Tulving, 1985).
Personal semantic memories present fewer phenomenological details and refer to memories of
general events or lifetime periods (Conway, 2009; Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch,
and Levine, 2012), or to episodic memories that have become semanticized over time
(Piolino, Desgranges, and Eustache, 2009). Both ways of recollecting past personal
experiences are considered as a kind of mental representation of past events by means of
2
internal visual images (specially for the case of episodic memory), concepts, or language
(Rubin and Umanath, 2015). Explicit memories can be externalized through natural language
but are nonetheless regarded as being essentially disembodied: besides the neural substrates of
personal memories and the vocal apparatus that is necessary for speech production, other parts
of the body are not considered to be involved in the recollection of the personal past.
My purpose is thus to challenge this disembodied conception of personal memory and
show that some explicit personal memories are highly embodied: facial expressions, tones of
voice, arms, legs and other parts of the body are genuine and common means of representing
the personal past. For this purpose, I analyse these forms of “theatrical performance” done in
the context of remembrances of past personal experiences. This analysis shows that we can
consciously represent our personal past experiences not exclusively through mental images or
language but also via bodily movements that can engage the whole body. Just like
professional actors use their body along with words to express meaning to spectators in a play,
in everyday life we also occasionally become actors while remembering our personal past.
The present article is organized into five sections. The first section presents some
conceptual remarks about the terminology used. The second section introduces and analyses
the paradigmatic examples found in the literature about this special way of remembering the
personal past through the body that I refer to as “kinetic memory.” The third section offers a
deep analysis of the representative nature of kinetic memories. This allows us to establish the
conditions that a bodily movement must meet to be considered a case of kinetic memory as
well as the existence of two possible types: mimetic and symbolic kinetic memories. The
fourth section contrasts kinetic memory with procedural memory, pragmatic action and
gesture in order to analyse the possible adaptive values and functional uses of kinetic
memories. The last section briefly highlights the specificity of this kind of embodied memory
by comparing it with other forms of embodied memories that have been mentioned relatively
recently in the literature.
My approach here is mainly semiotic and phenomenological, but also drawing in
detail on the small amount of relevant empirical work there currently is on this topic. Because
the study of bodily movements during the process of remembering the personal past is quite
underdeveloped in both philosophy and psychology to date, I do not pin down a final
definitive theory of kinetic memories: my claims are tentative and provisional at this stage.
My main aim in this article is thus to identify a range of fascinating phenomena which have,
as of yet, received insufficient attention, and to offer preliminary analyses of their nature and
functions.
Preliminary Remarks
The main purpose of this article is to demonstrate that personal memories can have
one special kind of embodied content, that I call kinetic content. Therefore, it is necessary to
define the main concepts in order to avoid misunderstanding.
On the one hand, “personal memory” is a term I use to broadly refer to all memories
of first-hand experiences where the self is implicitly or explicitly represented. This includes
not only memories of particular events, but also recurring experiences, periods of my life,
persons I met, actions I saw, places I went, odours I smelled, and so on. So, in this sense, the
notion of personal memory is not a synonym of episodic memory, which has been
conceptualized in terms of the experience the rememberer goes through while recollecting her
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past (Tulving, 1985) and, more recently, conceptualized in terms of visual and spatial scenes
(Rubin and Umanath, 2015) or fragmentary sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective
representations embedded in a framework that contextualizes them (Conway, 2009).
Therefore, personal memories can have multiple intentional objects; they can come with a
feeling of travelling back in time and re-experiencing something from the past, like episodic
memories. However, they can lack this feeling of pastness and present themselves as objective
and impersonal memories, that is, as semantic autobiographical memories (Levine et al.,
2004).
On the other hand, the notions of embodied and kinetic contents also need some
clarification. In general terms, embodied content refers to all bodily aspects related to
cognition, such as motor behaviors, motor tendencies, and bodily sensations. Nonetheless, in
this paper I will only focus on one particular kind of embodied content that I refer to as
“kinetic content.” Kinetic content related to memory refers in general terms to bodily
movements that are at the same time an act of remembering or part of an act of remembering
the past. It is important to highlight that kinetic content differs from any kind of sensitivity
originating from inside of the body: temperature, arousal, and other bodily feelings and
sensations, including motor tendencies. This interoceptive content is essentially internal
(although in some cases, like temperature, it can be exteriorized), unlike kinetic content which
is always external and public. Interoceptive sensations seem to be tightly connected with
affective states, that is, emotions, feelings, and moods. I have defended elsewhere (Trakas,
2015, 2021) that, while dealing with the relationship between emotions and memory, personal
memories can in general present affective content, among other possible contents such as
propositional and imagistic content (both of which are commonly recognized in the literature).
In this article I shift my focus to the possibility that personal memories present kinetic
content.
Whereas kinetic content is commonly attributed to procedural memories, such as
riding a bike (see the next section), it has been almost entirely forgotten from the analysis of
personal memories, except for the few examples I mention below. These examples are very
enlightening: they help to establish a distinction between kinetic content associated with
procedural memory and kinetic content associated to personal memory, and to better define
the kind of bodily movements that are of concern in this research.
The Paradigmatic Cases of Kinetic Memories
In their seminal 1966 paper, Martin and Deutscher mentioned the following instance
of memory:
Suppose that someone has never dog-paddled. He is not good at visualization and has
never learned any words which would describe swimming. His method of representing
the one time at which he saw a man dog-paddle is his actually doing the dog-paddle
stroke. We can imagine him trying to remember the curious action that the man went
through in the water.  He cannot describe it, and cannot form any picture of it. He cannot
bring it back. He gets into the water, experimenting a little until suddenly he gets it right
and exclaims, “Aha, that’s it!” (pp. 161-162)
This is an unquestionable example of kinetic content: the dog-paddling case is a motor
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behaviour that is at least part of an act of remembering, if not an act of remembering itself.
Nonetheless, it is not immediately clear if this example of dog-paddling motor behavior is a
case of personal memory or a case of procedural memory. Procedural memory refers in
general to motor skills that are the product of a gradual and implicit learning process. The1
operations of procedural memory are expressed solely in behaviour; which is why procedural
memory does not imply an explicit recollection of the past (even if it reflects memory of prior
episodes) and the traditional memory concepts of encoding-retrieval do not apply (Schacter,
Wagner, and Buckner, 2000; Tulving, 2000). As Casey (1987) explains, the habit-based
remembering of how to do an action is nothing more than the performance of that action; in
this sense, procedural memory presents kinetic content and is thus the enacted form of
memory par excellence. Typical examples of procedural memory include learning to ride a
bike and to tie one’s shoes.
Is, then, Martin and Deutscher’s example of dog-paddling a case of procedural
memory or not? At first sight, we could say that the action performed, dog-paddling, refers to
a motor skill, and this would give evidence for it being a case of procedural memory. But a
closer look allows us to corroborate that the concepts of encoding and retrieval do apply here:
this particular motor behaviour of dog-paddling constitutes the retrieval of a particular and
specific motor behaviour seen previously. The man is explicitly recollecting through bodily
movement a similar action observed in the past. There is no implicit learning (although
learning may yet occur in the future); there is an explicit and conscious process of retrieval
carried out through the body, and there is an explicit causal link between the present bodily
movement and a particular past experience, which in this case refers to the past observation of
a person dog-paddling. These characteristics are quite different from the distinctive features of
procedural memory, so from this it follows that Martin and Deutscher’s example is unlikely to
be considered as a classical case of procedural memory.
Nonetheless, Martin and Deutscher’s example refers to an action in general related to
the process of the acquisition of a skill. And that is why at first glance it can be easily
mistaken for a case of procedural memory. In order to help dissipate this confusion, another
paradigmatic example may help, this time authored by Ryle some years before Martin and
Deutscher’s classic paper on memory:
The stock accounts given of reminiscence give the impression that when a person recalls
an episode belonging to his own past history, the details of the episode must come back to
him in imagery. He must “see” the details “in his mind’s eye,” or “hear” them “in his
1 Whereas “procedural memory was originally intended to cover motor skills, such as tying shoes, riding a
bicycle, or typing,” “it was broadened to cover mental as well physical procedures” such as “the mental
processes involved in multiplying 24 X 16” (Roediger III, Zaromb, and Lin,, 2017, pp. 10-11). With time, “the
term procedural memory became broader and covered such topics as priming on implicit memory tests, classical
conditioning of responses, and habituation” and because of its opposition to memories that could be verbally
stated, “the broader term nondeclarative memory came into use” (Ibid). In the literature, the term “kinesthetic
memory” and “skill learning” have been used as synonyms of “procedural memory,” but they present
nonetheless a subtle difference: “kinesthetic (sometimes called motor) memories are those involved in motor
skills: the swing of a baseball bat, how to keep a hula hoop going, and so on through hundreds of other examples
(…) However, many other types of skill learning exist. There is verbal skill learning, such as learning to read
distorted or inverted text (..), learning of grammars.” (Roediger III et al., 2017, p. 15) In this article, I exclusively
use the notion of procedural memory to refer to motor skills, and avoid the other notions to not confuse the
reader. In fact, the notion of procedural memory is much more common in the empirical literature than
“kinesthetic memory” (for a particular use of the latter, see the final section) and it is also broader as I have
already explained. But I omit any reference to cognitive skills because what is at stake here is the difference
between bodily movements that are motor skills and those that are personal memories.
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head.” But there is no “must” about it. If a concert-goer wishes to recollect just how the
violinist misplayed a certain piece, he may whistle the bungled tune, or play it on his own
fiddle just as the artist had done it; and, if he repeats the mistake faithfully, he is certainly
recollecting the artist’s error. This might be his only way of recalling how the artist had
gone wrong, since he may be poor at going over tunes in his head. Similarly a good
mimic might recapture the preacher’s gestures and grimaces only by reproducing them
with his own hands and on his own face, since he may be poor at seeing things in his
mind’s eye. … If their mimicries … are good and if, when they go wrong, their authors
duly correct them without being prompted, their companions will be satisfied that they
have recollected what they had seen, without desiring any additional information about
the vividness, copiousness or connectedness of their visual imagery or even about its
existence. (Ryle, 1949, p. 260)
Whistling a misplayed piece or mimicking a preacher’s gestures are not related to the
acquisition of skills, and thus the differences with procedural memory are more salient than in
Martin and Deutscher’s example. In their example, the action of dog-paddle is certainly
related to an explicit and conscious process of retrieval and is causally linked to a specific
past event. However, it also constitutes one of the many repeated actions necessary for
learning how to dog-paddle. Ryle’s examples are exempt from this duality, and that is why
both the causal link with a particular past event and its purely representative nature becomes
evident. In fact, in this paragraph Ryle makes clear that memory is a way of showing and
presenting something that has already been perceived or experienced. This presentation of
something from the past not only can take the form of a visual image or a verbal narration, but
also of a mimicry or re-performance of some past experience. That is why these examples
highlight one characteristic that is essential to this form of embodied memories: their
representative nature. These cases refer to bodily movements that present something else than
themselves: when these motor behaviors are enacted, they mean and indicate a past “bodily”
event, that is, bodily movements that happened in the past. In Ryle’s examples, the past bodily
movements are observed actions, that is, past actions done by people other than the
rememberer, but they could also refer to performances done in the past by the rememberer
herself. To make fun of myself, I could re-enact, in front of my friends, the mimicking and
gestures I did in a conference. In both forms of re-enactment, their meaning is given by their
referent—the past bodily movement—and by presenting them again they represent them. In
contrast, procedural memories do not represent something from the past; in fact, they have
lost any mark of the past, and present themselves as simple habits that are tied to current
practical goals related to the specific environment in which they are performed.2
For clarification purposes, I propose to call “kinetic memories” these forms of
memories that present kinetic content but are not procedural memories, because they are
memories that refer to the personal past. In fact, it seems more appropriate to say that personal
memories can have kinetic content than to speak of kinetic memories. Whereas some personal
memories are expressed completely through a motor behavior, such as the examples
mentioned previously, in other (and maybe more common) cases of personal memory, only
one part or aspect is expressed through a kinetic component. As Sutton and Williamson
2 Although it may be tempting to consider that procedural memories do not represent at all, procedural memories
can have a representative nature: they can represent aspects of the culture or of the social position of the
individual, such as in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1980) analysis of the notion of habitus. For the purposes of this article,
it is not necessary to determine in which specific sense procedural memories represent (if they do); it is sufficient
to show that they do not represent some past event, and thus that they do not represent as kinetic memories do.
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(2014) explain, when remembering a difficult conversation at work, I may partly reinstate a
pattern of gestures and reproduce the embodied alignment I displayed during that
conversation. Although these cases do not properly deserve the name kinetic memory, I will
continue to use this term to refer to both cases (the entirely kinetic personal memory and the
personal memory that has a kinetic content among others) in order to simplify the discussion.
In this sense, the use of term kinetic memory is similar to the use of visual memory: in
general, this notion is adopted to refer not only to memories that are exclusively visual, but
also to the memories that mainly present visual imagery, among other kinds of contents such
as propositional or affective content. As Rubin (2006) explains, most of our episodic
memories—as well as our personal memories—do not come in one single format or possess
only one kind of content, but are constructed via the interaction between different basic
systems, “each of which uses fundamentally different structures and processes for
fundamentally different kinds of information” (p. 278). A variety of systems including vision,
audition, olfaction, spatial imagery, and other senses, as well as language, emotion, narrative,
kinesthesis and motor output can all contribute to the construction of personal memories, even
if they are not all involved for the construction of every single memory.
The Representative Nature of Kinetic Memories
More needs to be said about what kind of representations these embodied forms of
memories are. In order to better understand the representative nature of kinetic memories, two
questions must be answered: first, we need to understand the conditions that must be fulfilled
for bodily movement to represent something from the past; and second, we need to analyse
the way in which kinetic memories represent past bodily movements.
Conditions
To establish the conditions that must be fulfilled for a bodily movement to be a kinetic
memory, consider the following examples. Imagine that a concert-goer, instead of trying to
remember the violin piece he listened to last night, unwittingly starts to whistle this tune while
whistling different songs and tunes at work. Or imagine that after mimicking the preacher’s
gestures many times in front of her friends to make them laugh, my sister involuntarily
replicates these gestures herself while speaking at a conference. These two examples have
some similarities with Ryle’s examples: the traces involved (at least for the most part) are
probably the same, and both re-enactments derive from a specific past experience. The best
explanation of what the unwitting and the intentional re-enactor are doing is similar: in both
cases, the re-enactor is reproducing what she listened or saw before. Nonetheless, the
unwitting cases also present an important difference: the re-enactor does not see some other
event through the whistling or mimicking because she perceives it as an occurrent
performance, but not as a representation of a past event.
It is true that someone with enough information could recognize the re-enactment and
see through the current whistling and gestures a past bodily movement. Even the agent herself
might come to see some past event if it is pointed out to her that she is now re-enacting
something which she saw in the past. These examples can be considered as implicit kinetic
memories because they are used unconsciously, have become partially detached from their
context of acquisition and are only potentially representative of something past. Nonetheless,
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they are also potentially part of the process of learning a tune by heart, or acquiring a new
habit or skill, that is, they are also potentially part of the process of formation of procedural
memories. If my sister involuntarily does the preacher’s gestures while giving a speech on
two or three occasions, they no longer point to or represent the preacher’s past gestures. They
have become her own, a habit that characterizes her special way of giving a speech to an
audience. This double but dichotomic potentiality makes implicit kinetic memories a sort of
spurious case of kinetic memories. Implicit kinetic memories are halfway between actual
cases of procedural memories and explicit cases of kinetic memories. They could be
conceptualized as explicit kinetic memories that are going through a process of
proceduralization, similar to a certain extent to the process of semantization that affects some
episodic memories due to remoteness and aging (Piolino et al., 2009). Because of this
ambiguity, the pure explicit cases seem to be the most paradigmatic cases of kinetic
memories: the re-enactor (and eventually her potential spectator) can actually (and not
potentially) see some past event through her current bodily movements. In consequence,
although implicit kinetic memories are possible, only their explicit version can provide
genuine and exemplary cases of kinetic memories that are exempt of all ambiguity, and can
thus be useful to better analyse this phenomenon and unravel its characteristics.
An explicit representative nature is then essential to kinetic memory: something else
outside the current bodily movements must be actually seen through them. Whereas a
minimal causal link through memory traces to a past personal experience is a necessary
condition for bodily movement to be a memory, it does not seem to be a sufficient condition
for bodily movement to be a representation of something else. Another condition is thus
required to reach sufficiency: the rememberer must intend to perform a bodily movement in
which some event or action that took place in the past is actually seen. This theory of
representation in terms of “seeing in” has been suggested by Wollheim (1977) and perfectly
explains another of the main conditions of kinetic memories: the representative intention of
the rememberer. For actually seeing something in a bodily movement other than the current
bodily movement itself, the representative intention of the rememberer seems essential. If the
representative intention is absent, the bodily movement loses its mnemonic character; it is not
anymore a re-enactment of a past experience but a habit or a skill that is part of the subject’s
bodily movement repertoire. Even in the case that an implicit kinetic memory--which may be
still part of the process of proceduralization--suddenly becomes explicit for the subject, the
possibility of fully seeing something other than the current bodily movement itself depends on
her representative intention. Following my previous example, as soon as my sister recognizes
in her movements the preacher’s past gestures, two options are available to her: either she
changes the patterns of her bodily movements in order to avoid the consolidation and
proceduralization of this kinetic memory, or she decides to continue performing the preacher’s
gestures by explicitly recalling them.The intention of representing some past bodily
movements plays then a crucial role, and it fully expresses itself when the rememberer
intentionally re-enacts a past experience through the movement of her body, that is, when she
performs some bodily movements as part of an explicit and conscious process of
remembering a personal experience. It is important to make clear that I use here a semiotic
conception of representation, which simply implies that some elements may signify some
other object in different ways. This notion of “representation” should not be confused with the
notion of “mental representation” generally used in cognitive science to refer to mental
entities, such as neural structures, which have content and correctness conditions (see, for
example, Smortchkova, Dołęga, and Schlicht, 2020).
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We can then summarize the conditions that must be fulfilled for bodily movement to
represent a past personal experience in the following terms: for bodily movement to count as a
kinetic memory, the following conditions must be met: (a) the bodily movement must be
causally linked in a minimal sense to a past personal experience through some memory traces;
(b) the bodily movement must be a performance in which the personal experience that took
place in the past is actually seen; (c) the condition (b) can only be satisfied when the subject
who performs the bodily movement has a representative intention pointing to the past. In
other words, when she performs this bodily movement as part of an explicit and conscious
process of remembering the personal experience causally linked to it.
Note that what could be called “implicit kinetic memories” would in principle meet
condition (a) and a modified version of condition (b): the bodily movement should be a
performance in which this personal experience that took place in the past could be seen. The
more kinetic memories are implicitly retrieved, the less they are linked to the past personal
experience from which they originally derived, and the less this past personal experience can
potentially be seen.
Two other remarks need to be made concerning these general conditions of kinetic
memories. First, the notion of “past personal experience” mentioned in condition (a) refers not
only to first-hand experiences of specific past events, but also to repeated events I have
experienced, and even to persons I met, actions I saw, places I went, emotions I felt, and so
on. “Experience” is not thus a synonym of “a specific event,” or even of “an event.” Although
all the cases of kinetic memories previously analysed are memories of specific past events, we
could easily think of different examples. I can mimic the particular way my sister used to
touch her hair and constantly blink while talking, with the purpose of making the family
laugh. In this case, the bodily movements are not causally linked to a specific event, but are
linked through memory traces to a series of repeated events I have experienced. Other3
examples of kinetic memories that are causally linked to experiences that are not specific
events will be given in the next section when I analyse the different ways in which kinetic
memories can represent the personal past.
The second remark concerns the minimal causality condition and the notion of
memory trace. The notion of “cause” is used here in a very broad and indeterminate sense, as
it is generally used in causal theories of memory (see Bernecker, 2010; Martin and Deutscher,
3 I do not want to confuse the reader and imply with this sentence that a kinetic memory is simultaneously linked
to several past events through different causal chains. In fact, models of autobiographical memory have always
integrated repeated and general events and explained the relation between them and more specific events
(Barsalou, 1988; Conway 1992, 1995, 2009; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Linton, 1986). Barsalou (1988),
inspired by computational theories, proposed a theory of autobiographical memory hierarchically and
chronologically organized in three levels: extended-event timelines, summarized events and specific events.
According to his model, when an event is experienced, information about each aspect of the event—sister, hair,
to touch in a particular way, to blink, to talk—becomes integrated into the representation of the event. But at the
same time the generic information of the event that has been activated—sister, hair, to touch in a particular way,
to blink, to talk—interrelates between each other and gives rise to a long-term memory of a summarized event.
With time, this summarized event may become more accessible than the event memory itself. That is why the
encoding of a second similar event may cue and activate the summarization instead of cuing and activating the
memory traces of the first similar event. Moreover, the retrieval of a specific event may also activate the
respective summarization. In the case of repeated events of everyday trivial events, we could hypothesize that the
information of the context of acquisition of each specific memory (information that places a particular event in a
specific time and space) becomes more difficult to retrieve and can even be forgotten with time, whereas the
long-term memory of the summarized event is on the contrary reinforced each time the subject experiences a
particular instance of that event.
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1966, for a causal condition in terms of counterfactual dependency). It would certainly be
benefited by further specification, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into the
discussion of this complicated issue. I only ask the reader to avoid assuming that the causality
condition entails identity or a strong similarity between the past representation and the present
memory representation, and that it rules out generationism about memory content. In fact, I
assume a sort of minimal causal theory of memory: some traces left by the past event are
necessary to construct a memory representation of any kind. This nonetheless does not imply
that the memory representation cannot include information not originated in the experiential
representation of the past event. That is why this minimal causal theory that I assume—and do
not intend to discuss here—is compatible with generationism about memory content.
Concerning memory traces, I take them to carry informational content (although I
leave the specific nature of this informational content unspecified) and to be distributed.
Different basic systems—not only the motor system but also the visual system and other
sensory systems—may be involved in the formation of kinetic memories. There need not be
specific “kinetic memory traces”; kinetic memories may be constructed from relational
binding, operated by the hippocampus, between different memory traces. In this respect, the
process of kinetic memory construction would not differ significantly from that characteristic
of the personal memories more commonly analysed in the literature, such as personal memory
expressed through natural language and visual imagery. For example, when I mimic the
preacher’s gestures and grimaces in front of my friends, diverse memory traces may be
reactivated. These include visual traces of the preacher’s physical appearance, the church
where I heard his speech, the specific way he moved, auditory traces of his speech and his
particular intonation, semantic and motor traces of the general movements and attitudes
normally performed while giving a speech, as well as other traces of previous encounters with
the preacher and previous events in which I participated as an audience member. But these
also include motor traces formed during the experience. Motor-related areas of the brain are
not only activated when we perform actions but also when we observe actions, as the
extensive literature on motor resonance has shown (see for example the interesting study done
by Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, and Haggard, 2006). That is why specific
motor traces like the ones induced by practicing movements are also formed when we merely
observe actions (Stefan, Cohen, Duque, Mazzocchio, Celnik, Sawaki, Ungerleider, and
Classen, 2005), and these motor traces are likely to be reactivated when we remember those
actions (see also Galvez-Pol, Forster, and Calvo-Merino, 2020). Nonetheless, unlike4
procedural memories which are independent of the operations of the medial temporal lobe
memory system (Zola and Squire, 2000), it is expected that kinetic memories would recruit
the explicit memory system. This specificity would establish another difference between the5
paradigmatic cases of kinetic memories and procedural memories, as well as with their
spurious—and implicit—counterpart.
There is little work linking human bodily movements to memories of past
experiences and their neural substrates, but a recent study goes some way in this direction:
Hilverman, Cook, and Duff (2016) have provided evidence that patients with hippocampal
5 For a recent article that argues that evidence for a neat division between the declarative and procedural memory
systems is messy and inconclusive, see de Brigard (2019). Christensen, Sutton, and Bicknell (2019) also hold
that the declarative system makes a substantial contribution to skilled performance, and this calls for a revision
of the standard view of memory systems.
4 And this is the reason why the “translation problem,” that is, the problem of explaining how information
encoded in one format (in this case visual) is “translated” into another format (such as a motor format), is a
fictitious problem.
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amnesia produced significantly fewer gestures than healthy participants when remembering
different semantic and episodic memories. This suggests that gestures produced in the context
of an act of remembering are, at least in part, supported by the hippocampal region. The
authors warn us that further investigation is needed to determine “if the nature of the
relationship between gesture and memory is stable across tasks and behaviors, or if there are
conditions or contexts in which gesture might engage non-declarative or procedural memory”
(Hilverman et al., 2016, p. 11). In fact, another study has shown that the procedural memory
system seems to be necessary to learn and remember information and experience expressed
through hand gestures (Klooster, Cook, Uc, and Duff, 2015). It is true that these two studies
examine gestures which are not necessarily kinetic memories, such as common beat gestures
(I will come back to the difference and similarities between kinetic memories and gestures
below). It is also true that the studies examine gestures in different contexts. In the first study,
the gestures were spontaneously performed by the rememberer (the only instruction was to
remember different kinds of events), whereas the second study was essentially focused on
implicit learning of gestures and on their explicit voluntary retrieval. But despite these
differences, these two studies support the belief that both memory systems, that is, the
declarative and the procedural memory systems, are necessary for the production of some
gestures, and thus, are necessary for the construction of kinetic memories. In this respect,
kinetic memories would partly rely on the anatomical structures that are known as the
procedural memory system, without nonetheless being similar to specific occurrences of
procedural memories.6
Different Ways of Representing the Personal Past Through Kinesis
The second question mentioned at the beginning of this main section concerns the
way in which kinetic memories represent past experiences. Until now, all cases mentioned,
the representation of the misplayed violin piece, the past preacher’s gestures and grimaces,
and the special way of swimming seen for the first time, are cases of re-enactment and
mimicry. The rememberer recreates some movements previously performed or seen. These
examples may suggest that kinetic memories represent by the most primitive sense of
resemblance: physical resemblance. As O’Brien and Opie (2004) explain, “a representing
6 That is why it is extremely unlikely that kinetic memories would rely on a specific memory system. More
empirical research is certainly needed to better know the specific brain regions involved in kinetic memories. But
as I have suggested, there is a high chance that the anatomical structures normally attributed to the procedural
memory system and to the declarative one are both involved in the formation of kinetic memories. In fact, the
notion of “process specific alliances” (PSAs) would be probably very suitable to explain the brain network that
underlies kinetic memories. This notion has been recently introduced by Cabeza and Moscovitch (2013) to
expand and ameliorate the component process framework proposed by Moscovitch in 1992 as an alternative to
memory systems and processing modes frameworks. According to Cabeza and Moscovitch (2013), a process
specific alliance is “a small group of brain regions working together to achieve a cognitive process. This small
‘team’ is rapidly assembled in response to task demands and is rapidly disassembled when no longer needed.
Thus, we view PSAs as flexible, temporary, and opportunistic. These characteristics distinguish PSAs from
large-scale networks that are assumed to be relatively stable across tasks and persist during periods of rest” (p.
52). Therefore, according to this framework, episodic recollection is not the result of a memory system, but of a
process specific alliance mainly established between the angular gyrus and the hippocampus (Cabeza, Stanley,
and Moscovitch, 2018, p. 6). Although Rubin’s (2006) basic memory systems—which has been mentioned and
adopted in this article as the theoretical framework to explain memory recollection—explicitly states that
episodic memory is the result of the coordination of basic memory systems, his model is not incompatible with
the notion of PSAs, and could probably be reformulated in terms of a PSA without losing its essential features.
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vehicle and its object resemble each other at first order if they share physical properties, that
is, if they are equal in some respects” (p. 6). My representation of the violinist’s misplayed
piece, or of the past preacher’s gestures and grimaces, intends to be faithful to the original
bodily movement, and this means that it reproduces some of its physical properties.
But do all forms of kinetic memory represent by reproducing some of the physical
properties of what is represented? This question is intrinsically linked to another: must kinetic
memories solely represent bodily movements? If not, that is, if kinetic memories can represent
something that is not itself essentially “kinetic,” the answer to the first question is also
negative, so there must be another way in which kinetic memories can represent that is
different from physical resemblance with what is represented.
To explore this possibility, I analyse another example which is closely linked to the
second mode proposed by Lecoq to actors to use their bodies to “speak” to the audience on
stage: by miming aspects of reality that are not themselves essentially bodily movements. Let7
us imagine that my potential partner, who is a very introverted person and does not overtly
express his emotions, was completely disconcerted and felt very embarrassed when I
unashamedly told him that I liked him during last night’s dinner. As expected, he tried to hide
his feelings, but my knowledge of his personality and some minimal facial movements
allowed me to recognize his embarrassment and uneasiness. While recounting this episode to
a friend, I can tighten my belly, round my back and make myself smaller in the chair to
express that he was really embarrassed, that he just wanted the earth to swallow him up, but
without implying that he actually moved his body in this way. My friend and I both see in my
performance the emotion my potential partner experienced, even if originally this emotion
was poorly externalized through his body. This case appears to meet all the conditions
mentioned before, and is therefore a legitimate case of kinetic memory, yet a similar body
movement is not represented; instead a past affection or emotional state is what is shown.8
Because the representing and the represented have a different nature, i.e., one is a bodily
movement and the other one is an emotional state, the kinetic memory does not represent the
emotional state by reproducing some of its physical properties. In this case, the concept of
representation cannot be understood as physical resemblance. Therefore, in which sense
should the notion of “representation” be understood?
8 It can be questioned whether emotions are always physically embodied and thus always imply some kind of
bodily movement. I agree with this embodied conception of emotions, but as I explained in the “preliminary
remarks” section, emotions are generally related to bodily movements that are internal to the body and thus
private, such as temperature, arousal, and other interoceptive bodily feelings and sensations. These bodily
movements must be distinguished from the external and public bodily movements and motor behaviors that are
being discussed here. Emotions are certainly many times externalized through public bodily movements, but I
hope the reader will easily agree with me that this embodied externalization is not a necessarily constitutive
element of an emotion. It depends on the kind of emotion (more cognitive emotions such as envy, regret, guilt,
can probably be less externalized through the body than basic emotions such as anger, fear and sadness), the
contextual situation (some public situation often lead a person to hide her emotions), and the culture (some
cultures may externalize emotions more than others).
7 Lecoq took this distinction between mimicry and miming from the French anthropologist Marcel Jousse
(1886-1961) who studied gestures in oral (religious) traditions. Lecoq quotes an interesting paragraph of Jousse’s
posthumous work L’Anthropologie du Geste (1969/2008): “Miming differs from mimicry in this respect: it is not
imitation but a way of grasping the real that is played out in our body. A normal human being is ‘played’ by the
reality that reverberates in him. We are the receptacles of interactions that play themselves out spontaneously
within us. Human beings think with their whole bodies; they are made up of complexes of gestures and reality is
in them, without them, despite them” (Lecoq, 1987/2006, p. 4).
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Although it is true in very general terms that a kinetic memory covaries with the
attitude or emotion represented (I cannot represent a state of joy and a state of anger with the
same bodily movements), the idea of a functional or structural resemblance does not seem
adequate to account for this example. “A functional resemblance obtains when the pattern of
causal relations among a set of representing vehicles preserves at least some of the relations
among a set of represented objects,” whereas “one system structurally resembles another
when the physical relations among the objects that comprise the first preserve some aspects of
the relational organisation of the second” (O’Brien and Opie, 2004, pp. 9-10). It is quite
evident that neither the pattern of causal relations nor the pattern of physical relations of the
bodily movements that represent my potential partner’s emotional state preserve some aspects
of the relational organization of the emotional state that my potential partner felt during the
dinner. The notions of functional and structural resemblance do not account for the
representative nature of these particular cases of kinetic memory, because, in fact, these cases
of representation cannot be explained in terms of similarity. The notion of symbolic
representation is clearly better suited to explain the example mentioned above. Symbolic
movements can differ according to their construction (Poggi, 2008). The particular bodily
movements in the example given above refer to a metaphor that has a canonical form and a
shared meaning in English culture. Because they are paired with a stable meaning, they can be
considered to be codified symbolic movements. Nonetheless, some symbolic movements are
not part of a common ground of meanings in a community, but can be invented on the spot by
the performer and are thus new and creative. This means that symbolic bodily representations
of past personal experiences can be codified as part of the cultural background, or can be
creative as a result of the spontaneity of the individual.
I propose then to distinguish between two main kinds of kinetic memories: mimetic
kinetic memories and symbolic kinetic memories. While the first kind should be broadly
compared to cases of mimicry, the second one is more similar to cases of mime. We can thus
define the representative nature of these two types of kinetic memories as follows:
Mimetic kinetic memories: they refer to bodily movements that satisfy conditions a-c (above)
and represent past experience by physical resemblance, that is, through an occurrent imitative
realization of the past experience.
Symbolic kinetic memories: they refer to bodily movements that satisfy conditions a-c
(above) and represent past experience by being a symbol of the past experience. The symbol
can be codified and culturally shared in a community, or can be the result of the creative and
spontaneous performance of the rememberer.
It may be asked why mimetic and symbolic kinetic memories belong to the same kind.
First, both of them are bodily movements that meet the conditions mentioned before: (a) they
are causally linked in a minimal sense to a past personal experience, and (b) some other event
that happened in the past is seen through them, because (c) they are part of an explicit,
conscious process of remembering, that is, because the subject performs these movements
with a past representative intention, as a re-enactment of the past.
To this similarity, we could add a second one that characterizes the way in which
kinetic memories represent the past personal experience. Mimetic and symbolic kinetic
memories present some properties that in the literature have been attributed to demonstratives
and indexicals  (Braun, 2015; Kaplan, 1977/1989, 1989). Similarly to indexicals, both kinetic
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memories are demonstrations, that is, externalisations of the subject’s inner intention of
representing a past personal experience. These bodily movements not only describe a past
personal experience but also point at it, by realizing a demonstration of the same type as the
past personal experience. Furthermore, the meaning of both kinetic memories is provided by
their referent, and their referent depends on the demonstration itself, the subject’s
representative intention and the context of remembering. In certain ways, these three elements
provide the “rule” that determines the referent of the bodily movements performed. That is
why the same movements could have different referents and thus different meanings
according to the context and the subject’s intentions. I can tighten my belly, round my back
and make myself smaller in the chair to express someone else’s embarrassment, or my own
embarrassment from another past situation, or even to express a different kind of attitude or
sensation such as a past feeling of malaise. So the meaning of kinetic memories is not a
quality of the mimetic and symbolic bodily movements themselves but a function of the given
bodily movements in its total relation to contextual and intentional elements.9
Although the meaning of a kinetic memory is given by its referent, it is not exhausted
by its referent. Kinetic memory cannot be considered a pure indexical or a true demonstrative
in Kaplan’s (1977/1989) sense, as it is the case for deictic gestures such as pointing. Because
kinetic memories are memories, they have a reconstructive nature, and even in the imitative
cases, a reconstruction of a past bodily movement is hardly ever an impersonal, exact replica.
It is formed from different memory traces (as I explained in the last subsection) and, in most
cases, includes the perspective of the rememberer. This perspective means that not only does
her previous knowledge shape the way she remembers the event but also her present
intentions, emotions, interests, and so on. In this case, memory shaping is similar to the
particular way in which she performs the bodily movements. This particular way, this
embodied perspective, changes from rememberer to rememberer, and from one particular act
of recollection to another. A different rememberer could perform the same pattern of bodily
movements with a distinct personal touch. Even the same rememberer could perform on two
occasions the same pattern of bodily movements differently, according to her current
intentions, emotions and interests. This embodied perspective of the rememberer is thus
unique to each process of remembering, and is part of the meaning of the bodily movements.
That is why the meaning of kinetic memory is not exhausted by their referent.
These semiotic and phenomenological similarities between the representative nature
of mimetic and symbolic bodily movements that are performed in the context of remembering
the personal past, might lead to the supposition that the two kinds of bodily movements have
sufficient commonalities to be subsumed under the unique label of kinetic memory.
Nonetheless, further theoretical and empirical research is needed to determine other possible
similarities and differences at different levels of analysis, such as the filogenetic, the
ontogenetic, and the implementational ones. Concerning filogenesis, it is very likely that the
ability of reproducing actions generated by others in other places and at other times evolved
before the emergence of abstract and symbolic representational systems (Donald, 1991). In
any case, I do not pretend here to delve into these aspects. But in the next section, I do
develop another similarity between mimetic and symbolic kinetic memories that provides an
additional reason to consider both as belonging to the same general kind: a functional
similarity. For this purpose, I analyse the possible adaptive functions that kinetic memories
seem to perform in present-day Western culture, but I do not deal with the functions that they
9 For a similar functionalist approach to the meaning of certain symbols, such as pictures and music, see Langer
(1942).
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accomplished in ancestral environments and that led to their natural selection (they do not
necessarily need to match: see Smith, 2020).
Functions and Adaptive Value of Kinetic Memories
The functions of episodic and autobiographical memories have been a topic of
interest in recent years. It is generally accepted that episodic memories are functionally
adaptive because they allow us to simulate future events in order to plan and make decisions
in efficient ways (Boyer, 2009; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007).
Furthermore, individuals use episodic memories for a wider variety of purposes: to preserve
the continuity of the self, to develop and maintain social bonds, to reappraise the past in order
to regulate emotional states and moods, to teach others and feel a sense of achievement
(Bluck, Alea, Habermas, and Rubin, 2005; Harris, Rasmussen, and Berntsen, 2014). But what
about kinetic memories? These are generally (but not necessarily) part of larger acts of
remembering personal experiences, but seem to neither have the same adaptive function nor
the same variety of uses that are characteristic of episodic memories. Kinetic memories are
tied to the “here and now,” and it is difficult to see how they could play a role in efficient
future planning and decision making. Kinetic memories could eventually present a social and
conversational function, but they do not seem to have the other general functional uses
attributed to episodic memories.
Kinetic memories do, however, seem to serve present needs—but which kind? They
could respond to demands of the immediate environment, such as a communicative demand,
or they could be performed in the service of cognitive activities of the performer. Wilson’s
(2002) distinction between these two functions proves to be useful for the purposes of this
analysis. We can paraphrase and deepen her definitions of on-line and off-line embodied
cognition in the following terms:
On-line embodied cognition refers to bodily movements that directly respond to the demands
of the physical and/or social environment and thus directly introduce a change in the physical
and/or social world that is intended to be efficient for the actor.
Off-line embodied cognition refers to bodily movements that serve intrapersonal functions in
that they are put to the service of the higher cognitive processes of the producer. In this sense,
they do not directly respond to the demands of the physical and/or social environment and
thus can only indirectly introduce a change in the physical and/or social world.
Keeping in mind these two forms of embodied cognition distinguished by their functional
role, I analyse below the potential functions and adaptive value of kinetic memories by
comparing them with three other cases of embodied cognitions: procedural memories,
pragmatic actions related to an act of remembering, and gestures.
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Kinetic Memories and Procedural Memories
Probably the best and clearest example of on-line embodied cognition related to
memory is procedural memory. Riding a bike and tying one’s shoes are cognitive activities
that are always embedded in a task-relevant situation and related to the practical needs of the
physical environment. In fact, procedural memories are the case par excellence of on-line
embodied memory.
Casey (1987) presented an in-depth analysis of the functional value of procedural
memories (which he calls “habitual body memories”). He defines them as “an active
immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious,
orienting, and regular manner” (p. 149). The aspect of this definition that is of most interest
here is that procedural memories allow us to embody the past in actions and thus create
habitual bodily movements that operate “in an efficacious, orienting, and regular manner.”
How should we understand the efficacy, orientation, and regularity that pertain to the way that
procedural memories respond to environmental demands? To summarize Casey’s rich
characterization (pp. 151-153), we could say that procedural memories are: (a) efficacious,
because they constitute an entire second nature, an effective (and pre-reflective) history within
the body that seeks to introduce a difference in the environment that at the same time is
effective to the actor herself; (b) deeply orienting, because they form habits that allow us to
become familiar with our environment and to establish a base of assurance upon which more
complicated and spontaneous actions can arise; and (c) regular, because procedural memories
cannot be unpredictable and wayward if they are to be efficacious and orienting, although
they need not be restricted to repetition. To sum up, procedural memories “serve as our
familiaris in dealing with our surroundings—as a constant guide and companion of which we
are typically only subliminally aware” (p. 149), but which are indispensable in life so that we
can avoid consciously thinking about the right action to take in every occasion.
On the contrary, whistling the violinist’s misplayed melody or re-enacting the
preacher’s gestures and grimaces do not seem to constitute a second nature or exhibit a history
as procedural memories do. Although they may allow us in some situations to achieve some
goal—as it may happen with some kinetic memories that are embedded in the performance of
skilled actions, they neither help us to successfully navigate the world nor to stay oriented and
be familiarized with our surroundings. And although procedural memories are flexible, they
nonetheless present certain regularity that is absent from kinetic memories, which are
generally quite unique performances. We can thus conclude that kinetic memories do not
satisfy the conditions enumerated in Casey’s characterization of the specific (and essential)
functions that procedural memories play in our daily life. Nonetheless, there is still another
case of embodied cognition related to memory that may shed some light on the functions of
kinetic memories: instrumental and practical actions performed as part of an act of
remembering a personal past experience.
Kinetic Memories and Pragmatic Actions
For a comparative purpose, I begin with an example similar to one proposed by
Malcolm (1970, pp. 65-67). Let’s imagine that I leave the house with a friend in order to go
for a walk and she asks me if I locked the front door. I verbally can reply “yes,” “no,” or “it
was you that locked it.” However, I can also reply with an action: go back to my house and
lock the door. In principle, Malcolm states that nothing in this example indicates that before
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doing the action I had a conscious inner representation, like a visual image, of me and my
friend leaving the house without locking the front door. He concludes that there is no other
occurrence, in addition to the mentioned utterances and actions, which is the remembering
itself. Although some readers may reject Malcolm’s conclusion, I set this aside since my10
goal here is not to evaluate the plausibility of Malcolm’s statement. Instead I use Malcolm’s
example to contrast with the previously discussed examples of kinetic memory. Malcolm’s
example is useful because it refers to an action that, whether or not it is itself a memory, is
performed in the context of an act of remembering a past experience.
In this example, the motor behavior is embedded in a task-relevant external situation
and only makes sense in that particular environment. The intention behind it is to make a
change in the world; in this case, lock the door. This pragmatic action introduces a difference
in the environment that is unquestionably effective to the actor herself. Consequently, it is
possible to say that in this case, memory is operating to serve the needs of a body interacting
with a real-world situation. Because the cognitive-embodied activity—walking back home in
order to lock the door—is embedded in a task-relevant situation, it could be considered as a
case of on-line embodied cognition. A similar analysis can be applied to the famous case of
the Korsakoff’s patient studied by Claparède (1911): the patient withdrawing her hand is an
action attributable to the retrieval of a past event that aims to introduce a difference in her
environment: to avoid being picked again. But unlike Malcolm’s example, the retrieval of the
past event is implicit (or explicit but only known and not remembered).11
These two examples are nonetheless very different from the other examples that I
have labelled as kinetic memory. In those examples, the motor behavior is not relevant to any
11 Although this case is generally associated with the distinction between explicit and implicit memory,
Claparède’s commentaries about this patient are also intrinsically related to the problem of recognition and
source amnesia, which refer to the problem of conscious recollection (Kihlstrom, 1995; Nicolas, 1996). In fact,
the patient did access and retrieve some event information: “she argued that there was, perhaps, a pin hidden in
his hand, although she did not remember the episode in which this conditioning procedure was acquired”
(Nicolas, 1996, p. 1194). So the patient retained some information of the moment when she was picked, and
recovered it, without nonetheless remembering its source. Claparède mentions another similar anecdote: “when
the patient is urged to repeat what she has been told, she will sometimes end up answering correctly even though
she does not recall ever having had a conversation with you. One day we read a story to the patient about a
64-year-old woman who took her cattle to graze and was bitten by a snake. The next day, we asked her to relate
the story we had told her. She could not do so, and could not even recall having seen us the day before. We urged
her to answer, saying that it was about a woman and asking her how old the woman was. She then asked us:
‘Wasn’t the woman 64 years old?’ and then she quickly added that it was merely an idea that ‘crossed her mind’
and that she could have just as easily said something else. In other words, even when these memories arise
spontaneously, she does not recognise them as memories that she experienced herself. She believes them to be a
passing fancy, and never links them to her past life.” (Claparède, 1907/1996, p. 1198).
10 “It is true that neither your saying, ‘Yes,’ nor your saying, ‘You locked the door,’ nor your having an image,
nor your acting out the locking of the door, was the remembering. But neither was the remembering some other
event I failed to mention. It is a bad mistake to think that in those examples of memory, there was, in addition to
the mentioned utterances, actions, thoughts and feelings, some other occurrence which was the remembering
itself” (Malcolm, 1970, p. 67). And further on: “There is no requirement of an image, copy, picture, pattern or
representation in remembering” (Ibid, p. 69). Malcolm’s original example is slightly different from the one
described in the body of the paper. He mentions two different kinds of memory actions: one corresponds to the
re-enactment of the movements made in leaving the house (a case of kinetic memory), and the other to the fact of
raising the hand when there is a mistake in the oral description made by a third party of the movements
performed in leaving the house. According to him, these two kinds of actions, as well as verbal utterances and
visual images, are all cases of memory occurrences.
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task in the physical environment: it clearly does not pretend to cause a change in the world. It
is true that some kinetic memories, especially (but not only) implicit ones, may help us to
achieve a goal, as I have mentioned. For example, in a live music performance a skilled
musician may replay parts of a particular solo already performed during rehearsal. But this
goal-oriented aspect is not necessarily present in kinetic memories, as it happens in pragmatic
actions that are attributable to the retrieval of a past event. The explicit cases of kinetic
memories that are of concern here do not seem to show this characteristic. Furthermore, there
is an additional difference between these pragmatic actions and the examples of explicit
kinetic memories under consideration: the latter’s meaning is independent from the physical
environment where it is performed because it is mainly determined by its referent. I can
remember last night’s misplayed piece by whistling it at home, while walking on the street, or
on the top of a mountain, and in all these occasions the meaning of the whistling is the same.
Because many kinetic memories are brought about by a representative intention whose
reference bears the mark of the past, they are not cases of on-line embodied cognitions like
the pragmatic actions performed in the context of an act of remembering a personal
experience.
Nonetheless, there could be a further sense in which kinetic memories allow the
producer herself to achieve some goal. First, we might think that they should be better
understood as a kind of off-line embodied cognition that may serve some higher-order
cognitive process of the producer. In this case, kinetic memories would be similar to epistemic
actions: unlike pragmatic ones, epistemic actions are external actions that an agent performs
in order to facilitate mental processes (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). Secondly, we might think
that kinetic memories refer in fact to a body responding to environmental and external
demands: mimicking the preacher’s gestures and bodily demonstrations of someone else’s
embarrassment could be done for a communicative purpose. In this regard, kinetic memories12
would be sensitive to physical and social context, always count as bodily movements
responding to environmental demands, and be considered as cases of on-line embodied
cognitions which mainly serve interpersonal and communicative functions. These two
possibilities are explored in the next section.
Kinetic Memories and Gestures
If the adaptive value of kinetic memories is relevant for communication, a
comparison with gestures turns out to be necessary. Gestures, like kinetic memories, do not
cause a change in the world, but are traditionally considered to have communicative value:
they enhance the comprehension of the semantic information of the speaker’s message by
adding another dimension that makes its own contribution to meaning (Hostetter, 2011;
Kendon, 1994; McNeill, 1992, 1998). This is probably why Lecoq thought that mimicry and
miming were necessary practices for an actor’s performance: because they convey meaning
that cannot be transmitted to the audience via other modalities such as spoken words.
Therefore, if kinetic memories are similar to gestures and if gestures accomplish a
function that responds to the communicative demands characteristic of the social
12 Mahr and Csibra (2018) have recently advocated a communicative function of episodic memory: episodic
memories would allow us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past.
Nonetheless, their analysis is very different from the one proposed here: they focus on the epistemic authority
that memory confers and its role in communicating about the past. The communicative function explored here
refers to the enhancement of communication.
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environment, kinetic memories should be considered as on-line embodied cognitions whose
adaptive function is to enhance communication. At first glance, this idea seems quite
plausible. Nonetheless, this argument rests on two questionable ideas: first, that kinetic
memories are gestures and second, that gestures, and thus kinetic memories, have a primarily
communicative function.
Concerning the first supposition, if we define gestures as “movement of the arms
and hands in a region of space reserved for symbolic expression, typically in front of the
torso” (McNeill, 1998, p. 11), it is evident that kinetic memories cannot be reduced to
gestures. Unlike gestures, kinetic memories can suggest the movement of other parts of the
body. They can also relate to movements of the arms and hands conducted in front of the torso
which are not generally considered as gestures, such as self-touching actions and object
manipulations (McNeill, 1992). In fact they can involve all motor repertoires, including
posture and locomotion, such as dancing and walking, and voice modulation.
We could thus say that although kinetic memories cannot be limited to gestures
alone, they certainly can take the form of gestures. We may be tempted to believe that kinetic
memories, because of their representative nature, can only take the form of iconic gestures,
that is, of gestures that bear a physical resemblance to their meaning. But this is not in fact the
case. Imitative kinetic memories can take the form of any kind of gesture: iconic,13
metaphorical, deictic (or pointing) or beat gestures (McNeill, 1992). I can, for example, use
deictic gestures to reproduce the way my boss pointed at me in an accusatory tone during our
last meeting. I can use beat gestures to imitate the particularly funny way a keynote speaker14
moved her hands while presenting her paper at a conference. Whereas imitative kinetic
memories that take the form of gestures are not necessarily iconic, symbolic kinetic memories
that take the form of gestures are mostly metaphoric gestures: they represent an abstract idea
or a concept (such as my potential partner’s feeling of embarrassment).
Nonetheless, it is important to highlight a main difference between kinetic memories
which take the form of gestures and other gestures performed by the speaker. Regarding
kinetic memories, the speaker invites the receiver to “see in” her gestures and other bodily
movements a representation of something from the past, as if these gestures and bodily
movements do not belong to her and should not be interpreted as her own but rather as signs
of something or someone else related to the past. By reproducing the preacher’s gestures and
grimaces, the speaker does not want her audience to believe that she is actually expressing
herself; rather she wants her audience to see her current gestures and grimaces as the past
preacher’s gestures and grimaces. That is why in communicative situations, kinetic memories
seem to have more commonalities with theatrical performances than with other gestures
performed in everyday life that are directly attributed to the performer. An actor wants her
audience to believe that all the gestures and movements that she does, belong to the character
she represents and not to the person that she is. We can thus conclude that kinetic memories
that take the form of gestures can only be a subgroup of gestures and this does not depend on
14 Imitative kinetic memories that take the form of deictic gestures may be infrequent, even rare, but are
nonetheless possible. It would be interesting to study these special cases when the deictic gesture is produced in
the context of remembering the personal past without the intention of directing the recipient’s attention to where
the finger points.
13 Although it is interesting to notice that in one of the few studies done so far to analyse gestures in the context
of remembering past events (Hilverman et al., 2016), the authors observed that deictic gestures were relatively
infrequent : participants only occasionally used a pointing gesture, and they did it to refer to themselves or to the
experimenter.
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the kind of gestures themselves but on the context, which is determined by the subject’s
intention of representing a past personal experience.
Furthermore, there is another difference between gestural kinetic memories and
gestures that are directly attributed to the performer. Some gestures are thought to
communicate nonsemantic information, such as the speaker's internal state, her attitude
toward the addressee, and other information that in some situations can be important for the
communicative interaction (Krauss, Chen, and Chawla, 1996). Kinetic memories performed
in a communicative situation can in certain cases provide information about the speaker’s
appreciation and perspective of her past personal experience (a memory is always a
reconstruction and the remembered event is in general shaped by the rememberer’s intentions
and emotions), but unlike some gestures, they do not seem to provide any information about
the relationship between the speaker and the receiver.
On the other hand, two points can be made concerning the second supposition of the
argument mentioned at the beginning of this section regarding the communicative adaptive
value of gestures and kinetic memories. First, there are few empirical studies that analyse
symbolic gestures and other bodily movements while remembering personal past experiences,
so the idea that kinetic memories, as well as gestures, are exclusively performed in
conversational situations is more an intuition than an empirically confirmed fact (for a review
of the relationship between memory and gesture, see Cook and Fenn, 2017). Ryle’s whistling
case and Martin and Deutscher’s dog-paddling case are clear examples of kinetic memories
that are independent of a social context or a communicative situation. We could easily think
about similar examples of kinetic memories expressed in solitude: someone can try to imitate
a dance movement previously seen at a show when they get home. Alternatively they could
simply remember a personal experience in a dialogic conversation with herself (through inner
speech), and simultaneously execute some kinetic memories. Here, kinetic memories would
not be dissimilar to gestures, which can also be done when the listener is out of sight and there
are no visible communicative demands (Alibali, Heath, and Myers, 2001; Pine, Gurney, and
Fletcher, 2010). This is so even in inner speech when people dialogically interact with
themselves for self-regulation, such as learning a second language (Lee, 2008), or when
children perform private pointing gestures as a way of self-organizing and self-regulating
their own behavior (Delgado, Gómez, and Sarriá, 2009). Therefore, kinetic memories, like
gestures, may present a communicative purpose, but this purpose does not seem to be their
sole function.
Secondly, even gestures which are generally considered to be on-line embodied
cognitions can in fact be understood as off-line embodied cognitions which serve higher
cognitive processes. Gestures seem to play a role not only for the observer, but also for the
producer. In fact, gestures serve multiple intrapersonal functions, that is, they have multiple
beneficial effects at the linguistic and cognitive level for the speakers who produce them.
They help formulate coherent speech by aiding in the retrieval of words from the mental
lexicon (Krauss et al., 1996); they are implicated in the process of integrating nonverbal
information into a format that is available for speech and in this way they help with speaking
(Kita, 2000); they facilitate working memory capacity in the moment in which they are
produced (Cook and Fenn, 2017), and they improve the encoding of information (Cook, Yip,
and Goldin-Meadow, 2010) among many other intrapersonal functions (see for example
Church and Goldin-Meadow, 2017; Krauss 1998). The importance of their intrapersonal
functions has led some researchers to state the controversial idea that gestures add very little
to a communicative exchange under ordinary circumstances and that their main functions are
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intrapersonal (Kita, 2000; Krauss, 1998; Krauss et al., 1996). Although the debate is ongoing
(Hostetter, 2011; Pine et al., 2010), Krauss and colleagues consider that gestures may
principally serve higher cognitive processes and may not necessarily be related to the
communication demands of the physical or social environment. In this case, gestures seem no
different from other motor movements such as the “looking at nothing” phenomenon. This
refers to oculomotor mechanisms, more specifically eye movements, that are activated in the
absence of appropriate external stimuli while remembering a scene or elements of a scene
(Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, and Hoover 2009; Richardson and Spivey, 2000; Spivey and
Geng, 2001). It seems that the locations to which eye movements are directed appear to be
determined, at least in part, by the mental representation of the scene remembered (Altmann
and Kamide, 2004). Because this type of eye movement helps to retrieve information and is
thus at the service of memory, it accomplishes an intrapersonal function and is better
considered as off-line cases of embodied cognitions.
In sum, we can say that the intuitive argument that considers kinetic memories to
have a communicative value based on the identity or similarity between kinetic memories and
gestures is not well grounded. Kinetic memories cannot be reduced to gestures, and nor can
the function of gestures be reduced to the enhancement of communication.
Different Kinds of Functions of Kinetic Memories
The previous analysis leads us to a more plausible hypothesis about the adaptive
value of kinetic memories. Some kinetic memories are certainly like pragmatic actions: they
are embedded in a task-relevant external situation and aim to introduce a change in the
physical and/or social world that benefits the subject. So, they are adaptive because they are
useful to achieve the subject’s goals, such as communicative goals. But other kinetic
memories―especially those whose meaning is independent from the physical environment
where they are performed, which are those of interest here―may present pragmatic benefits,
such as enhancing the comprehension of the speaker’s message, as a residual effect of the
fulfilment of an intrapersonal function: to better cue personal memory. Personal memory can
be triggered by different aspects and features of the past personal event it derives from, and
kinetic prompts might be particularly effective. They may also be particularly effective to
retrieve rich details of the past event as well as aspects of the past subjective experience that
may be hard to recover. By doing so, they may even intensify the rememberer’s feeling of
reexperiencing the past. One great scene of the series Twin Peaks, when Donna recounts a
memory to the agoraphobic Harold Smith, exemplifies this adaptive value of kinetic memory.
In this scene, Donna, in a sitting position, presents the context of her memory: she was 14
years old, at the Bang Bang Bar with her friend Laura Palmer and three boys in their 20s. She
then lights a cigarette as she mentions that the boys were older than Laura and her, so they
made both girls feel older. At that moment she starts to mentally travel back in time to relive
that special night out, when she probably smoked. While recalling what happened, she
pronounces an assertive “yes” along with a sensual gaze in her impersonation of Laura’s
foreseeable response to one invitation to party. When Donna starts to tell what happened in
the woods, where they all went to party, she gets up and her remembrance becomes fully
embodied. She impersonates Laura again, as she dances with the boys and moves her hips
back and forth; she then impersonates Tim―one of the boys―with arms crossed, while he
stares at Laura and feels desire for her. She finally embodies her past self, when she was
jealous of Laura getting too much attention, and loudly suggested they go skinny-dipping. She
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continues to remember what happened next with her whole body: she pulls down the neck of
her T-shirt while she reveals that they take off their clothes; walks backwards to express that
she swam away, stunned, when Laura started to kiss two of the boys. She next walks forwards
to show how Tim swam out to her in a resolute manner; touches the hand on her chest with
the other hand when she tells how Tim kissed first her hand, and then her lips, and so her
hands slowly move towards her mouth, and her fingers roll gently all over her lips. Donna
then says: “I still can feel that kiss.” This exceptional performance by Lara Flynn Boyle as
Donna exemplifies not only how in an act of remembrance, different perspectives of the past
event can be expressed through bodily movements, some of them mimetic, others more
abstract and symbolic. Also―and more importantly here―these bodily movements do not
primarily respond to communicative demands despite being performed in a social context.
Donna performs these bodily movements neither to enhance the comprehension of Harold
Smith nor to entertain him―she does not even look at him during her act of recollection―but
to better remember that cherished moment of her personal past that she wants to
communicate. By performing these mimetic and symbolic movements she can truly travel
back in time, not only “mentally” but with her full body, reexperience the event and remember
it with precise details that would probably not be accessible otherwise. The body, or rather the
embodied mind, finally seems to know things about which the disembodied mind is ignorant,
as Lecoq precognized.
Donna’s bodily movements can be considered as off-line embodied cognitions and,
more particularly, as off-line embodied memories: rather than memory operating to serve real
body-world interactions, the body and its control systems are used as part of the process of
memory retrieval, and enhance the quality and the quantity of details retrieved. Only a few
empirical studies have gone in this direction, but they do seem to support this possibility.
These empirical studies have shown that children who gesture (in an iconic and non-iconic
manner, even with pointing gestures) when recalling an event report more details than
children who are prevented from gesturing (Cameron and Xu, 2011; Delgado, Gómez, and
Sarriá, 2011; Stevanoni and Salmon, 2005). Dijkstra, Kaschak, and Zwaan (2007) have shown
that people recall faster and more accurately when body positions during retrieval are similar
to the body positions that occurred during the original experience. This last result supports,
once more, the encoding specificity principle: recollection is facilitated when an overlap
occurs between the elements of the retrieval context and those of the encoding context
(Tulving and Thomson, 1973). In a study by Casasanto and Dijkstra (2010), participants
recalled more positive memories when they moved their arm upwards and more negative
memories with a downward arm movement (a similar effect was already demonstrated by
Riskind, 1983). The arm movements here could be broadly interpreted as symbolic kinetic
memories. These metaphorical representations “arise from a pattern of associations of
concrete experiences (cheering, jumping out of joy) with certain body movements (upward
movement)” [Dijkstra and Post, 2015, p. 5], so they are not arbitrary symbols, but are abstract
symbolic movements after all. It is true that these studies are focused on gestures and do not
take into account the difference between gestures and kinetic memory, but they nonetheless
implicitly analyse some gestures that could be considered as cases of kinetic memory. More
empirical studies should certainly be done in this line of research, taking into consideration
the distinctions previously mentioned between kinetic memory and gestures and bodily
movements that do not enter into this category, as well as the specific representative nature
that is characteristic of kinetic memories. These studies could shed more light on the
intrapersonal functions of these embodied kinds of memories.
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In conclusion, kinetic memories can be considered neither pure cases of on-line
embodied cognitions nor pure cases of off-line embodied cognitions. They sometimes are
intentionally performed to achieve a practical goal, and can present a communicative or social
intention; but other times, like in Donna’s remembrance, they present communicative benefits
without being essentially oriented to enhance communication. This is possible because kinetic
memories, like gestures, probably fulfill a double adaptive function: they present pragmatic
benefits, among which are included the enhancement of communication and other social and
conversational purposes, such as engaging the audience, getting the audience’s attention or
making the audience laugh; but they also fulfill intrapersonal functions, because they improve
the overall process of remembering and reexpericing the past event. Rythmic beat gestures
and other gestures that may be performed in an act of recollection may certainly facilitate
memory recall too. But they do it by reducing the working memory load, helping to retrieve
words from the mental lexicon and to translate nonverbal information into a verbal format. So
they may only facilitate the retrieval of perceptual, sensorimotor and affective components of
the past experience in an indirect way. Furthermore, they are not part of the memory itself. On
the other hand, kinetic memories improve the overall process of remembering in a direct and
contentful way because they are themselves meaningful components in the re-construction of
the past experience. They are carriers of mnemic content and at the same time make us relive
the past experience with more intensity and, plausibly, produce a richer and more detailed
reconstruction of it.
Whereas from the point of view of the finality, kinetic memories may be at the service
of memory recollection; from the point of view of the form, they accomplish a specific
representative function: kinetic memories are the only kind of bodily movement that points to
the past. They always represent a past personal experience (or some aspect of it) and that is
why they cannot be directly attributed to the producer. Opening up one’s arms and expressing
the magnificence of a landscape does not mean the same thing as reproducing the same
gesture while remembering that experience at home. So these bodily movements, despite
presenting a physical resemblance, cannot have the same function either. This specific
representative function of past personal experiences needs to be highlighted because it
establishes a significant difference between kinetic memories on one hand, and common
gestures and pragmatic actions on the other.
Kinetic Memories and Other Forms of Embodied Memories
There are only a few relatively recent references in both philosophical and
psychological literature concerning the embodied aspect of memories of our personal past
experiences. I briefly review them here, showing that none analyses the phenomenon of
kinetic memory.
Traumatic memories, for which there is an entire field of study in psychology, are the
most common examples of embodied memory related to our personal past that are found in
the existing literature. Freud is well known as one of their first theorists: unsconscious
repressed memories of a traumatic past event, such as childhood sexual abuse, leave traces in
the form of embodied symptoms, such as a painful need to urinate (Freud, 1896/1962).
Phenomenologists have also thoroughly analysed how traumatic events leave traces in the
body. For example, according to Casey (1987), traumatic memories may sometimes lead to
implicit re-actualizations, and sometimes inhibit action (a tooth trauma may inhibit
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mastication), but in both cases they present certain characteristics that make them very
different from kinetic memories: (a) when they are not explicitly re-experienced, traumatic
memories are marginal, part of the ground of our experiences rather than explicit figures,
whereas kinetic memories are part of an explicit conscious process of remembering and are
thus at the center of our experience; (b) traumatic memories possess an inner opaqueness and
that is why they are felt “as a density in depth” (Casey, 1987, p. 166), whereas kinetic
memories are voluntary and intentional, and their meaning is transparent for the subject; (c)
traumatic memories are characterized by a co-immanence of past and present, because the
past is not represented but prolonged and acted in the present, whereas kinetic memories
represent the past and, although they bring the past to the present, they also keep a clear
distinction between these two temporalities. The characteristics of traumatic memories are
also present in their counterpart: “erotic body memories.” Erotic body memories refer to the
traces that episodes of erotic pleasure implicitly leave in the body, which are also implicitly
recalled through the body, for example, when we encounter the one who caused our past
pleasure. So erotic body memories are also distinct from kinetic memories. In fact, traumatic
and erotic body memories present more similarities with procedural memories than with
kinetic memories. These commonalities are rightly reflected in Casey’s joint analysis of these
three types of body memories (Casey, 1987, pp. 146-180).
More recent analyses of traumatic memories have emphasized, in the similar vein as
Freud, long-lasting changes in the posture, gestures and movements produced in the body
(Caldwell, 2012), the “inner gesture” or the enduring style of coping that is rooted in a
traumatic episode but has forgotten its own situated origins (Behnke, 2012). Once again, this
characterization of traumatic memories in terms of structural changes in the body presents
more commonalities with procedural memories than with kinetic memories: they are always
implicit, and involuntary as certain habits. It is true that, unlike procedural memories, there is
still an intrinsic causal link between the present bodily movement and the particular past
traumatic experience. But, unlike kinetic memories, this link is blurred, invisible, not
represented in the bodily movement. When the causal history is unraveled and the traumatic
memory acquires a narrative form, the subject recovers a sense of agency and can unlearn the
programmed body memory or re-pattern it (Caldwell, 2012). Therefore, as soon as the posture
or bodily movements are seen by the subject as a “representation” of a past traumatic event,
the subject tries to regain control over them and aims to modify them. This same strategy
takes place after a past trauma is explicitly but involuntarily re-experienced as it were
happening anew. In PTSD, the recalled traumatic event is processed as happening in the
present rather than belonging to the past (Brewin and Holmes, 2003) and might involve the
re-enactment of some past behaviour, such as ducking as if to avoid a blow (Holmes and
Mathews, 2010). These bodily movements do share some characteristics with kinetic
memories―especially with implicit kinetic memories: someone could recognize the
re-enactment and see the past event through the current bodily movements. However, there
are essential differences between these explicit forms of embodied traumatic memories and
the explicit kinetic memories that are of interest here. Explicit embodied traumatic memories
are certainly at the center of the subject’s experience, but they are involuntary and their
meaning is opaque to the subject. The past is re-enacted in the present and not represented.
What is more, because the past trauma is not experienced as past but as a present new threat,
explicit embodied traumatic memories are not really explicit. Despite being explicit
experiences, they are not explicit memories: they are conscious experiences but not conscious
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recollections. In conclusion, embodied traumatic memories, in their implicit as well as in their
explicit form, are very different phenomena from kinetic memories.
A similar kind of distinction can be made between kinetic memory and “kinesthetic
memory” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2003, 2012), “ Rilkean memory” (Rowlands, 2015, 2017), and
Fuch’s (2012) taxonomy of embodied forms of memory. Inspired by Luria’s work,
Sheets-Johnstone (2003, 2012) considers that the notions of “procedural memory” and
“implicit knowing”  are too mechanical and spatial, and do not do justice to the dynamic,
voluntary, and affective aspects of bodily movements. Bodily movements are kinesthetically
perceived and kinesthetically encoded. This explains her choice of naming these kinds of
memories “kinesthetic memories.” Kinesthetic memories refer then to memories of
perceptions of spatio-temporal dynamics of our own body in motion. They are inscribed in the
body as felt patterns of movements that shape the way we move and allow us to experience it
with a sense of familiarity, while at the same time they are flexible enough to adapt
themselves to the particularities of each situation. Although Sheets-Johnstone’s notion of
kinesthetic memory presents a quite different―and innovative―picture of habits and body
memory, it still includes the main characteristics attributed to procedural memory. Kinesthetic
memories are an effective second nature, the repertoire of “I cans”; they are deeply orienting
in our environment and provide us with a sense of familiarity; they present certain regularity
despite their flexibility; and they do not represent the past but prolong it in the present. As I
have already argued, these characteristics are absent from kinetic memories. Furthermore,
kinesthetic memories, like embodied traumatic memories, are at the margins of our
experience. And although we can eventually turn our attention to them and bring them to the
fore, the level of awareness usually involved is very different from the explicit awareness
characteristic of kinetic memories.
More recently, Rowlands (2015, 2017) introduced the poetic term “embodied Rilkean
memories” to refer to a sort of context-dependent habits, that is, to patterns of behavioural and
bodily dispositions inscribed in the body that are embedded in a particular environmental
context and are originated in past events. Embodied Rilkean memories derive from episodic
memories, when their content has been forgotten and only the act of remembering persists:
I open the door in a certain way— one that minimizes its creaking— not because I
remember that it creaked. Rather I open the door in this way because a pattern of
behavior has been inscribed in my body— and this pattern was inscribed in me
precisely because the door creaked. This pattern that has become thus inscribed in
my body is my Rilkean memory of the creaking door. If I had no associated episodic
or semantic memories, then this Rilkean memory would be my only memory of this
door. (Rowlands, 2017, p. 58)
Although embodied Rilkian memories are not considered to be procedural memories in the
proper sense of the term, they are efficacious and certainly help us to orientate ourselves in
our surroundings. What is more, they are contentless, a pure act of remembrance, so they do
not represent the past but they reenact it. And Rowlands also conceives them as involuntary.
So once again the similarities with procedural memories are quite salient as well as the
dissimilarities with kinetic memories. And despite the fact that Rilkean memories arise from
episodic memories and are indirectly linked to past experiences, they do not have intentional
content and are never explicit: an explicit episodic memory can accompany a Rilkean
memory, but it never transfers its content to a Rilkean memory nor fuses with it.
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Finally, Fuchs’ (2012) rich taxonomy of the embodied forms of memory does not
account for kinetic memories either. Besides procedural and traumatic memories, Fuchs
distinguishes other different kinds: (a) painful physical experiences taken into the memory of
the body are “pain memory”; (b) “situational memories” refer to memories of sensory and
atmospheric perceptions of our body interacting with the world that help us to stay oriented in
different spaces; (c) “intercorporeal memories” point to the implicit bodily knowing of how to
interact with others which is formed from past encounters and help shape implicit relational
styles; and (d) “incorporative memories,” that is, bodily habits and attitudes shaped by social
roles and culture that have been internalized as a second nature, similar to Bourdieu’s (1980)
notion of habitus. Each type of body memory presents its particularities, but none refers to the
ways in which the body explicitly represents the past.
To sum up, none of the relatively recent discussions of embodied forms of memory
mentioned in the literature analyses the representative bodily forms that conscious and
explicit memories of our personal past experiences can take. Traumatic, erotic, kinesthetic,
Rilkean, situational, intercorporeal, incorportive, and pain memories all refer to the traces that
different kinds of past events “print” in our body in various ways. If they conserve their
singularity and do not become part of the repertoire of our habits and dispositions, they are
only implicitly— and many times involuntarily— retrieved. In this article, I have tried to fill
this gap by offering an analysis of the way in which the body constitutes a means of
representing past personal experiences. Explicit personal memories do not necessarily need to
be imagistic or linguistic; explicit personal memories can also take embodied forms, and more
specifically, kinetic forms.
The present analysis aims to enrich the already existing inquiry into embodied forms
of memory. Contrary to Bergson and Fuchs, for whom “body memory does not represent the
past, but re-enacts it” (Fuchs, 2012, p. 19), this article argues that the body can indeed
represent the personal past by re-enacting it. In this sense, it should be clear to the reader that
the purpose here is not to introduce and add another memory “natural” kind to the already
vast taxonomy of memory, but to highlight a particular embodied form that our past
experiences can take in everyday recollection.
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